Research supporting the empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that the value assumption of the theory of rational choice is wrong. Apparently, humans can value more than their own welfare. Empathic concern felt for someone in need can produce altruistic motivation with the ultimate goal of increasing that person's welfare. But this altruistic motivation is not always a friend of the common good. Research also reveals that empathy-induced altruism can pose a threat to the common good in social dilemmas. Indeed, in certain nontrivial circumstances, it can pose a more powerful threat than does self-interested egoism.
* * * Why do people act for the common good at cost to themselves? Why do they contribute to public TV or the symphony, support school-bond issues or welfare programs, volunteer for community projects, recycle trash, or conserve scarce environmental resources? In the behavioral and social sciences, the orthodox answer has long been that people act for the common good when and only when it is in their personal interest to do so-when the personal benefits outweigh the personal costs. Ecologist and social-policy analyst Garrett Hardin (1977) called this the Cardinal Rule of Policy: "Never ask a person to act against his own self-interest" (p. 27). Similarly, economist Mancur Olson (1971) asserted that "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest" (p. 2). Such individuals will act for the common good only when the personal value to them of that good exceeds the cost to them of the act-or when promotion of the common good is an unintended consequence of pursuing self-interest.
As Olson's assertion makes clear, this orthodox answer rests on the theory of rational choice (Downs, 1957; Taylor, 1976; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) , which in turn rests on two assumptions, a rationality assumption and a value assumption. The rationality assumption is that humans will choose the action that is most likely to get them what they want. The value assumption is that what they want is to maximize self-interest.
A long line of research by Kahneman, Tversky, and others has addressed-and challenged-the rationality assumption, showing that people's decisions are often illogical and suboptimal for getting them what they want (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) . But this research has not questioned the value assumption, that people want to maximize self-interest. As a result, it has not challenged the core of the orthodox answer to the question of why people act for the common good.
Acting for the Common Good in Social Dilemmas
Research on social dilemmas has, however, challenged the value assumption. A social dilemma arises when (1) each individual in a group or collective has a choice about how to allocate scarce resources (e.g., money, time, energy), and (2) allocation to the group as a whole provides greater good for all than does allocation to self, but (3) allocation to self provides more personal self-benefit than does allocation to the group as a whole. In such a situation, one cannot appeal to mutualism or cooperation (see Brosnan, this volume). The action that is best for me personally is to allocate resources to myself rather than to the group as a whole. But if each individual tries thus to maximize personal welfare, the strategy will backfire. Everyone, including me, will be worse off. Unilateral pursuit of what is best for each creates a situation in which everyone suffers more. Hence, the dilemma. (For a conceptual analysis of social dilemmas, see Dawes, 1980 ; for research examples, see Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988.) What does the theory of rational choice predict will happen in a social dilemma? Catastrophe. It predicts that each individual will blindly and relentlessly pursue his or her own personal self-interest rather than the
